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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RICHARD LEEROY TODD, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 940050-CA 
Priority No, 2 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Thi s .1 .b 1'iiJ appc a.l f rorri r o n r i.ct: i o n s of Hutornob..; l e h o m i r i d e , a 
third degree felony, :i n violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 
(Supp. "- • driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
thereby upon anot In--! i; .i t'lass A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. R 4 1-6-44 (1993). 
This Court has jurisdiction ^ the appeal under Utah 
Code ) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The followinq issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the court correctly deny defendant's motion t.o 
suppress the blood alcohol test result when the blood was taken 
wit. h'"'Ul". a warrant alter defendant's refusal? This claim,, involves 
the interpretation of Utah's implied Consent Statute, Utah Code 
Ann- § 41-6-44,10 1:19,93), and is reviewed under a correction of 
eT"ror star»dar'd West Vailey Citv v , Streeter, 849 p #2d 613, 614 
(Utah App. 1993). 
However, defendant has not properly preserved nor adequately 
briefed tin' i l *i' u < T h fj J ^ f < u e d e f e n d a 111: " «, • <: ] a i"»p " s '»* a i \»e d a n d 
this Court should decline to consider it. State v. Brown. 856 
P.2d 358, 359 n.l (Utah App. 1993) (issues not properly preserved 
for appeal are waived); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 
1988) (footnote and citations omitted) (reviewing court is 
entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority 
cited). 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support convictions for 
automobile homicide and driving under the influence resulting in 
an injury accident? On appeal, the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences are reviewed in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah App. 1991). 
Moreover, the defendant must marshal all the evidence in support 
of the jury's verdict and then demonstrate that it is 
insufficient to support the conviction. Otherwise, the court may 
properly decline to consider the sufficiency of the evidence 
adduced. State v. Chavez, 840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant text of constitutional, statutory or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues are included 
in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of automobile homicide, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207, 
(Supp. 1993) and one count of driving under the influence 
resulting in bodily injury upon another, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1993) (R. 1). 
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Pr i oi I: ::> 1 2 " i a ] , de fens e c01 ins e 1 moved t o si lppress t he 
results of the blood alcohol test 01 1 grounds that the sample had 
not been taken i n conformance with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
<H I (if 1 ini i'up|i I I1','), k'lih'lii s t a t e s I \\H\ il 1 p e r s o n c o n t i nues 
to refuse the blood test after being notified of the driver's 
license consequences, no test may be given K. 2 3 Addendur h 
'. • '• ' The S ta t :e oj
 ::.--. d tl: n 2 fitc I ' • 
heard argument but transcript of the hearinc -1- t 
the record on appeal. The court denied defendant'~ motion ,:.. 
3 0, A d d e n d Li ni I«1 
A jury convicted defendant of both charges. He timely 
appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was the driver of a pickup truck involved in a 
si ng] e car accident on June 27, 1993# at approximately 3:05 a.m. 
(R. 221 22, 2F*. ^10) , The only witness provided a statement 
that the truck passed him traveling eastbound, came into the 
•. " **ame 0 iebL 
-. 1 - econstructing \ accident from 
1- marks left * .: :„; c road, :.. officer concluded t nat the right 
f it (•- F "1 . H 1 iroacil info ( h e g r a v e l HI, ml t h e d r i v e r 
overcorrectec . trying to regain the paved surface sending the 
truck into , . eventually rolling .r - lefendant 
ai id 1 1 :i s s.jrs wei e 1 1 . 
One of the passengers died at .. ... scene and the other was 
severely injured (R. 223, 240-41). There was a strong odor of 
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alcohol at the scene and numerous beer cans around the truck (R. 
234, 238, 283) . 
When the assigned investigating officer arrived, the 
accident victims, including defendant, had already been placed in 
ambulances (R. 253) . The officer smelled a definite odor of 
alcohol in the ambulance and asked defendant if he had been 
drinking. Defendant replied a couple of beers whereupon he was 
arrested for driving under the influence (R. 255, 289, 302, 323). 
Defendant refused to submit to a blood draw. At that point, the 
officer instructed the emergency medical technician (EMT) not to 
draw blood and the officer left the ambulance. He returned a few 
minutes later, stated that one of the passengers had died, and 
instructed the EMT to draw the blood despite defendant's 
objection (R.255-57, 315). The accident occurred at 3:05 a.m. 
and the blood was drawn at 4:12 a.m. (R.269). A subsequent blood 
analysis revealed a blood alcohol content of .12% (R. 354-55). 
At trial, defendant and his witnesses testified that he had 
not been drinking the night of the accident and was not 
intoxicated (R. 226-27, 229, 365-66). Defendant did admit to 
drinking one beer around 4:30 p.m. the previous afternoon and on 
cross said that he drank two beers (R. 378-79, 384, 405) . 
Defendant's theory of the accident was that he had fallen 
asleep at the wheel after a hard day of working and dancing (R. 
4 06). He also testified that he had bronchitis and had taken 
about two and a half tablespoons of Robitussin around 7:00 p.m. 
and approximately 6 and a half ounces of Vicks cough syrup an 
4 
hour to an hour and a half prior to the accident (R. 379-80, 386, 
3 94, 399-400). Defendant acknowledged that he had begun to feel 
tired about twenty minutes before the accident and while he 
thought about pulling over, never did (R.387-88, 401-02). He 
specifically denied that he was trying to pull over when the 
accident occurred (R. 4 01). Defendant did not believe that he 
was affected by the alcohol or cough syrup (R. 406). 
On rebuttal the State's toxicologist testified that it would 
have been physically impossible for a person to have a .12% BAC 
if he had drunk only what defendant claimed All of the alcohol 
would have been out of his system by the time of the blood draw 
at 4:12 a.m. (R. 410-13). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Defendant did not properly preserve his claims for appeal. 
In his pre-trial motion to suppress the blood alcohol analysis, 
defendant raised an entirely different issue than he now urges on 
appeal. Below, defendant argued that the blood alcohol results 
should be suppressed because the officer did not comply with Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (2) (a) (Supp.1992). Apparently, defendant 
was unaware that the statute had been amended prior to 
defendant's accident. Defendant now argues that the 1993 
amendment to section 41-6-44.10 (2) (a) authorizes an 
unconstitutional search and seizure under both the Utah and 
United States Constitutions. 
Even though defendant cited the fourth amendment of the 
United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah 
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Constitution in his motion, he offered no legal analysis or 
authority to support his position. On appeal, defendant's 
argument is likewise lacking in legal analysis or citation to 
authority. Defendant's cited cases are distinguishable on their 
facts and thus, have no bearing on this matter. Therefore, this 
Court should decline to address the search and seizure issue on 
appeal. 
Even assuming this Court were to reach the merits, 
defendant's failure to provide any independent state 
constitutional analysis limits the search and seizure issue to an 
analysis under the fourth amendment. Under Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), police may take blood without 
consent and without a warrant where there is probable cause to 
believe that the person was driving under the influence of 
alcohol or other drug and exigent circumstances exist. Accord 
City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994). Sections 
41-6-44.10 (1993) and 41-6-44.5 (1993) are in accordance with 
Schmerber. For this reason, the trial court properly admitted 
the blood alcohol results. 
As to the sufficiency claim, defendant has failed to marshal 
the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, therefore, this 
Court should refuse to consider defendant's challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence. However, if the Court were to reach 
the merits, there is ample evidence to support the jury's 
verdict. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DF7~'DANT HAS NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED NOR 
PS ~ VTELY BRIEFED HIS CLAIM OF AN 
U CONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON 
APPEAL; EVEN IF THE COURT REACHES THE MERITS, 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ARE FRIVOLOUS 
A. Defendant did not preserve his claim of an 
unconstitutional search and seizure for appeal. 
The State does not dispute that defendant refused the blood 
test when requested to submit by the officer. In his motion to 
suppress the blood alcohol test results, defendant raised two 
arguments: (1) the blood was taken in violation of Utah's 
Implied Consent Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 
1992), and (2) the blood draw constituted an illegal search and 
seizure under the fourth amendment and article I, section 14, of 
the Utah Constitution. The 1992 version of se" ion 
41-6-44.10(2)(a) (Supp. 1992), stated "Following this warning, 
unless the person immediately requests that the chemical test or 
tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, no test may 
be given." 
Defendant obviously did not realize that section 41-6-44.10 
was amended in the 1993 general legislative session to take 
effect on May 3, 1993, deleting the quoted language. He also 
failed to cite to section 41-6-44.5(1) (b), also amended and 
taking effect on May 3, 1993, which states in pertinent part "In 
a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10 does 
not render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence 
of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content is admissible 
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except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution." 
According to the legislative history, this 'language was added 
specifically to allow blood test results into evidence, even if 
taken over defendant's refusal, if the offense resulted in a 
criminal trial. See Floor Debate, vote on S.B. 85, 50th Utah 
Legis., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 17, 1993) (Senate Recording No. 22) 
(statement of Sen. Beattie) and Floor Debate, vote on S.B. 85, 
50th Utah Legis., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 19, 1993) (Senate Recording 
No. 24) (statements of Sen. Beattie and Sen. Peterson). 
On appeal, defendant challenges the constitutionality of the 
1993 amendment to section 41-6-44.10, a challenge not raised in 
the lower court. In York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah 
App. 1994), this Court stated: 
"This court will not consider issues raised 
for the first time on appeal absent plain 
error or exceptional circumstances. State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993); 
accord State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 892-93 
n.6 (Utah 1993). An issue is preserved for 
appeal when "a party . . . timely brings the 
issue to the attention of the trial court, 
thus providing the court an opportunity to 
rule on the issue's merits." LeBaron & 
Assoc., Inc. v. Rebel Enter., Inc., 823 P.2d 
479, 482-83 (Utah App. 1991). 
Since defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of the 
1993 amendment to section 41-6-44.10 and section 41-6-55-44.5 
below, the issue has been waived. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 
359 n.l (Utah App. 1993); Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(d). 
B. Defendant's claim is unsupported by legal analysis. 
On appeal, defendant asserts that although he was subject to 
the provisions of the Implied Consent Law, section 41-6-44.10, he 
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retained the right to withdraw that consent by his refusal to 
submit. He further contends that at the time he refused, the 
officers were required to obtain a warrant before proceeding with 
the blood draw. Although defendant makes reference to both the 
Utah and United States Constitution, he offers no analysis to 
show that a warrant was required under these circumstances. He 
also offers four case citations without any discussion of why 
these cases are applicable to his appeal. One of his cited 
cases, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), specifically 
held that a warrant was not required. 
In sum, defendant's legal analysis of the issues presented 
on appeal is inadequate. He makes no attempt to apply legal 
principles to the facts presented. Although he cites Schmerber, 
defendant does not acknowledge that it is controlling nor that 
its holding is contrary to his position. Accordingly, this Court 
should refuse to consider defendant's claims, and affirm his 
conviction. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 
1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support [his] argument by 
any legal analysis or authority we decline to rule on it."); 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) ("[A] reviewing 
court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with 
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research.") (footnote and citations omitted). See also State v. 
Garza, 820 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah App. 1991) ("[W]hen an appellant's 
argument contains no citations to the record and no legal 
9 
authority, and as such does not comply with briefing rules," 
appellate courts will decline to reach the issue raised on 
appeal.) 
C. Defendant's claims are frivolous. 
Even if the Court were to determine that there was adequate 
preservation of the issues and adequate briefing on appeal, 
defendant's claims are without merit. Defendant argues that 
under the Implied Consent statute, he retained his right to 
withdraw his consent. This argument was rejected in Cavaness v. 
Cox, 598 P.2d 349, 351 (Utah 1979) wherein the court stated that 
the implied consent statute was civil in nature and applied to 
driver's license revocations only. Moreover, the statute does 
not give a "right" to refuse a chemical test, only the physical 
power. Id. at 352-54. 
Defendant's claim of an illegal search and seizure is in 
direct conflict with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in 
Schmerber. In Schmerber, under circumstances similar to those 
presented here, the Court upheld the warrantless extraction of 
blood from a defendant who refused to consent to the procedure. 
384 U.S. at 770-72 (footnote omitted). The Court made clear that 
the fourth amendment does not require actual consent before blood 
may be extracted without a warrant from a person in a case where 
there is probable cause to believe that the person was driving 
under the influence of alcohol or some other drug and there are 
exigent circumstances. Similarly, this Court has recognized 
under a fourth amendment analysis that exigent circumstances may 
10 
justify the warrantless extraction of blood. City of Orem v. 
Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1393 (Utah App. 1994) (Exigent 
circumstances are determined by the totality of the 
circumstances, including rapid dissipation of blood alcohol; the 
short time available to obtain the evidence; seriousness of the 
offense; and, reasonableness of the police conduct). 
Because defendant has not provided any analysis to 
explain why exigent circumstances should be treated differently 
under the state constitution, the court should decline to 
consider this claim. Id. at 1387 ("We refuse to provide the 
independent [state constitutional] analysis defendant has failed 
to submit, (citations omitted). 
POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE, THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO 
CONSIDER HIS CLAIMS OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, 
ALTERNATIVELY THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
A. Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence. 
Defendant's brief fails to marshal the evidence that 
supports the jury's verdict. The purpose and spirit of the 
marshaling requirement were perhaps best expressed in West Valley 
Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). 
There, the appellant's efforts, in presenting " a general 
catalogue of [the] evidence" adduced at trial were found to be 
deficient. The court explained that 
the challenger must present in comprehensive 
and fastidious order every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports 
the very findings the appellant resists. 
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After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must 
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The 
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the court's 
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly 
erroneous. 
Id. 
In State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990), the 
Utah Supreme Court applied the marshaling requirement in a 
criminal bench trial. Shortly thereafter, in State v. Moore, 802 
P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990), this Court first applied the 
standard to criminal appeals from jury verdicts where sufficiency 
of the evidence was challenged. 
Since that time, this Court has required adherence to the 
rule. State v. Galleqos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1189-90 (Utah App. 1993) 
(court addressed sufficiency of evidence on four counts for which 
supporting evidence was marshaled, but refused to address similar 
claims on six counts for which evidence was not properly 
marshaled); State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992) 
(refusal to review sufficiency of the evidence where marshaling 
requirement not met); State v. Chavez, 840 P. 2d 846, 848 (Utah 
App. 1992) (refusal to address challenge to trial court's 
findings of fact in an evidentiary ruling for failure to marshal 
evidence supporting the findings); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 
472-73 (Utah App. 1991) (court refused to address insufficiency 
of evidence claim where, instead of marshaling evidence 
supporting verdict, defendant simply recounted evidence favorable 
to him); State v. Dav, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991) 
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(defendant neither marshaled evidence submitted at trial which 
supported jury verdict, nor did he argue why such evidence was 
insufficient). 
Defendant does nothing more than provide a general 
recitation of the facts. It is not an effort to muster the 
evidence favorable to the verdict and demonstrate its 
insufficiency. Because defendant has failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict, this Court should refuse 
to address his claim of insufficient evidence. 
B. The jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. 
Even if the Court finds adequate marshaling, the evidence 
was sufficient to support the verdict. An appellate court gives 
broad deference to the fact finder, therefore, its power to 
review jury verdicts is limited. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 
784 (Utah 1991); State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1322 (Utah App. 
1993). The court views the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the verdict and assumes 
the jury believed the evidence and inferences supporting the 
verdict. State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah App.), cert, denied 859 P.2d 
585 (Utah 1993). A jury verdict is reversed only if the evidence 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
defendant committed the crime. State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 
985 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, the evidence established all of the requisite 
13 
elements of the charged offenses. The State only needed to prove 
that defendant had a blood alcohol content over .08%, he drove 
negligently, and there was an accident in which someone died and 
someone else was injured. Defendant's own explanation for the 
cause of the accident establishes negligence. He was tired, 
taking medication, knew he should pull over but did not (R. 379-
400). Coupled with the uncontroverted evidence of a .12% blood 
alcohol content (R. 354-55) and death of one passenger and injury 
to the other (R. 233, 240-241), the evidence was sufficient to 
support the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has either not preserved his claims for appeal or 
provide the legal analysis and support the appellate rules 
require. Even if the Court were to conclude that there was 
sufficient preservation and analysis, defendant's claims are 
without merit. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /Y*~ day of October, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JANICE L. FROST 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing brief of appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Elliott Levine, attorney for appellant, Summit County Public 
Defender, P.O. Box 526116, Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6116, this 
ft)^ day of October, 1994. 
AQ.U.H.,^^^-
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
UTAH CONST, art. I, §14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 (Supp. 1993). Automobile homicide. 
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third 
degree felony, if the actor operates a motor vehicle while having 
a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by weight, or while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that renders the 
actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the 
death of another by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner, 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent" means 
simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care 
that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or 
similar circumstances. 
(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided 
by Section 41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of 
chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to 
determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this 
section. 
(6) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol 
content or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by 
Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1993). Driving Tinder the influence 
of alcohol, drugs, or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol 
concentration 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two 
hours after the alleged operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that 
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a 
violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a 
proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner; 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.5 (1993). Admissibility of chemical 
test results in actions for driving under the influence 
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in 
which it is material to prove that a person was operating or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test or tests 
as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence, 
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 
41-6-44.10 does not render the results of a chemical test 
inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol 
content or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by 
Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10 (1993). Implied consent to 
chemical tests for alcohol or drug 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is 
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests 
of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining 
whether he was operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any 
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, 
if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a 
peace officer having grounds to believe that person to have been 
operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited 
under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or while under the influence 
of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug 
under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's 
body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then 
been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of 
the chemical tests under Subsection (1) , and refuses to submit to 
any chemical test requested, the person shall be warned by the 
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to 
submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the 
person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
ADDENDUM B 
ELLIOTT LEVINE (USB #1939) 
Summit County Public Defender 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O.B. 526116 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84152-6116 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C015RT °* St"»*» County 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH °+«*Q** *£& 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
RICHARD LEEROY TODD, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS BLOOD TEST 
AND ANALYSIS 
CASE NO. ^ 3/ 3.D I 501 
JUDGE: WILKINSON 
COMES NOW ELLIOTT LEVINE, Attorney for the Defendant in the above 
captioned case and files this Motion to Suppress pursuant to Rule 12 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and UCA, section 77-23-12, 
moving this court to suppress the blood sample taken from the 
Defendant and the subsequent laboratory analysis of Defendant's blood 
sample• 
As grounds for this motion the Defendant asserts that: 
1. The drawing of the Defendant's blood sample by force, after 
the Defendant was placed under arrest, after the law enforcement 
officer twice requested a blood sample from the Defendant, after the 
Defendant twice refused to submit to a blood draw and coupled with the 
law enforcement officer's failure to give the required admonition 
prescribed by UCA, section 41-6-44.10(2)(a) was in violation of UCA, 
section 41-6-44.10(2)(a) [to wit: "Following this warning, unless the 
person immediately requests that the chemical test or tests as offered 
n n o., 
by a peace officer be administered, no test may be given*,f] and 
constituted an illegal search and seizure which violated the 
Defendant's constitutional rights guaranteed under the 4th Amendment 
of the US Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the Constitution 
of Utah. 
2. The drawing of the Defendant's blood sample was in violation 
of UCA, section 41-6-44.10(2)(a). The refusal of the defendant to 
submit to a blood draw after the Defendant was placed under arrest, 
after the law enforcement officer twice requested a blood sample from 
the Defendant and after the Defendant twice refused to submit to a 
blood draw, coupled with the law enforcement officer's failure to give 
the required admonition prescribed by UCA, section 41-6-44.10(2)(a). 
As legal authority for said motion, Defendant states and relies 
upon the following cases and Utah Code annotated sections: 
State v. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307 (Utah, 1968) 
In the Interest of R.L.I., 771 P.2d 1068 (Utah, 1989) 
State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App., 1991) 
Due to the illegality of the Defendant's blood draw, based upon 
the totality of circumstances surrounding the blood draw, Defendant 
requests that this motion be granted. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this matter be set for an 
evidentiary hearing prior to the trial in this matter. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that they hand-delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document on this 20th day of October, 
1993 to: 
SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
SUMMIT COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 2ND FLOOR 
COALVILLE, UT 
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ADDENDUM C 
Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
RICHARD L. TODD, 
PLAINTIFF, 
DEFENDANT. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS BLOOD TEST AND 
ANALYSIS 
CRIMINAL NO. 931301509 FS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant is charged with Automobile Homicide, a Third Degree Felony, and Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol and Inflicting Bodily Injury Upon Another, a Class A 
Misdemeanor. The defendant was involved in an automobile accident on June 27, 1993 in Echo 
Canyon, Summit County, Utah. The arresting officer, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Sheldon 
Riches, arrived at the scene of the accident at approximately 3:49 a.m. Trooper Riches noticed 
that there was a large amount of alcohol containers around the single vehicle that was off to the 
side of the road and had rolled over. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript page 14). Trooper Riches 
went to the ambulance at the scene and talked to the defendant. The defendant identified himself 
as Richard Todd and said that he was the driver. (Preliminary Hearing transcript page 15). 
No. 
FILED'"" 
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C'f* of Summit County « 
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Trooper Riches smelled a strong odor of alcohol while inside the ambulance talking to the 
defendant. (Preliminary Hearing transcript page 15). The defendant said he had been drinking. 
(Preliminary Hearing transcript page 16). Trooper Riches then placed the defendant under 
arrest. (Preliminary Hearing transcript page 16). Trooper Riches asked if the defendant would 
submit to a chemical test and the defendant refused. (Preliminary Hearing transcript page 16). 
Because of the death of one of the passengers in the vehicle, Shane Hermanson, Trooper Riches 
instructed the EMT, who is authorized by the State of Utah, to draw blood from the defendant. 
(Preliminary Hearing transcript page 16). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE BLOOD SAMPLE ARE ADMISSIBLE 
Defendant misconstrues the application of Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, in his Motion. Section 41-6-44.10, deals with the implied consent law which 
is civil in nature and which provides only for the revocation of the privilege of operating a motor 
vehicle. See Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P2d 349 (Utah, 1979). If there has not been compliance 
with Section 41-6-44.10, drivers license may be unable to revoke the driving privilege, but that 
does not effect the admissibility of the chemical test in the criminal case. 
Section 41-6-44.5 specifically authorizes the admission of the defendant's blood test at 
trial. Section 41-6-44.5(1) provides: 
(a) "In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material to prove 
that a person was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test or tests as authorized in 
Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence. 
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(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10 does not 
render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's 
blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible except when 
prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution." 
Section 41-6-44.5 was amended by the legislature in 1993, which amendment became effective 
May 3, 1993. Section 1(b) is a brand new addition to the statute, which is applicable to all 
criminal cases after its effective date of May 3, 1993. 
Defendant cites Section 41-6-44.10(2)(a) as reading as follows: 
"Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests that the chemical 
test or tests is offered by a peace officer be administered, no test may be given." 
(Defendant's Motion pages 1 and 2) 
However, that is not the way Section 41-6-44.10(2)(a) reads presently nor is it the way it read 
at the time of the offense on June 27, 1993. The legislature amended Section 41-6-44.10(2)(a) 
to remove the language cited by defendant prior to the time the defendant committed the offense. 
The legislature apparently amended Section 41-6-44.10(2)(a) and 41-6-44.5 in response to the 
court decisions cited by defendant. Those statutory amendments now legislatively "over rule" 
the cases cited by defendant. However, even without the statutory amendments, the cases cited 
by defendant are distinguishable from the defendant's case. Each of the three cases cited by 
defendant, State v. Cruz. 47 P2d 307 (1968), In the interest of R.L.I.. 771 P. 2d 1068 (Utah, 
1989), and State v. Sterger. 808 P. 2d 122 (Utah App., 1991) involve defendants who had not 
been arrested when the blood was drawn. In all three cases cited by the defendant, the courts 
made it clear that the defendants were not under arrest when the blood was drawn. Had the 
defendant been under arrest, obviously the blood test would have been admissible under the 
former statute. The court suppressed the tests in the three cases cited by defendant, only 
because the defendant was not under arrest. 
3 
The present Section 41-6-44.5 makes the chemical test admissible even when there has 
not been compliance with Section 41-6-44.10. "Evidence of the defendant's blood or breath 
alcohol content or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or 
the constitution." It is clear that there is no rule of evidence that prohibits the introduction of 
the test results of defendant's blood sample. Likewise, it is well settled that the State can take 
a blood test from a driver, even when the driver refuses to give his consent. The United States 
Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California. 384 US 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1956) held that the 
State of California could constitutionally take by force, if necessary, a blood sample from the 
intoxicated driver. The U. S. Supreme Court made it clear in Schmerber v. California that the 
States have the right to draw blood and introduce the test results thereof even if the defendant 
did not consent to the blood draw. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the cases cited by defendant are factually distinguishable, because the defendant 
was under arrest. The statute cited by defendant is not the current statute in effect and does not 
apply to the defendant. The legislature revised Section 41-6-44.5 and Section 41-6-44.10 to 
legislatively "over rule" the cases cited by defendant. Clearly, Section 41-6-44.5 makes the 
results of the blood sample taken from the defendant admissible. The only way that the 
defendant can keep the results out is to show that it would be prohibited by the Rules of 
Evidence or the constitution. Such a showing cannot be made. Based on the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v. California, supra, it is constitutional to take a blood 
sample from the defendant even when the defendant has not given his consent or even forcibly 
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resists. The blood sample taken from the defendant was proper in all respects, and the test 
results of the blood sample are admissible. 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Blood Test and the Analysis thereof must be denied. 
Respectively submitted 
SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid, this 22nd day of October, 1993, 
to Elliott Levine, attorney for defendant, P. O. Box 526116/Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6116. 
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ADDENDUM D 
No 
Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
RICHARD L. TODD, 
PLAINTIFF, 
DEFENDANT. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS BLOOD 
TEST AND ANALYSIS 
CRIMINAL NO. 931301509 FS 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Blood Test and Analysis came on regularly for hearing 
on October 25, 1993, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
District Court Judge presiding; defendant appeared in person and with his attorney, Elliott 
Levine, and the plaintiff appeared through its attorney, Robert W. Adkins, Summit County 
Attorney. The Court considered the Motion, heard the arguments and statements of counsel, 
and being fully advised in the premises, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs Motion to Suppress Blood 
Test and Analysis be, and the same hereby is, denied. 
Dated this day of October, 1993. . . . " '• 
BY THE COURT: 
F I L E D 
0 0
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Cler/t of Summi* County 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid, this 25th day of October, 1993, to Elliott 
Levine, attorney for defendant, P. O. Box 526116, Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6116. 
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